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Introduction 
  
 In this chapter, my aim is to examine the contribution which feminist thinking 
makes to the ethics of international affairs. This is a more complicated matter than might 
at first be apparent, because feminism does not speak with one voice. Moreover, 
contestation within feminism as an international movement, in particular over questions 
of political violence and questions of peacemaking and peacebuilding has become 
increasingly acute over the past decade, in the wake of developments such as the passing 
of UNSCR 1325 and the so-called ‘War on Terror’. In the first section of the chapter, 
because contestation over feminist ethics reflects contestation over feminist politics, I 
give a selective account of feminist political activism in the international sphere, in 
particular in relation to issues of war and peace, and the impact this has had on 
international politics and policy. In Section Two, I examine the trajectory thinking about 
international ethics that is most associated with feminism, the ethics of care. In Section 
Three, I examine two distinct feminist critiques of the ethics of care: justice ethics and 
difference ethics. In conclusion I argue that although there are disagreements between 
feminists about ethics and international affairs, which reflect divisions about what 
feminism should mean in the international realm, there are nevertheless certain thematic 
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commonalities that cut across these divisions. What emerges is that feminist international 
ethics, whether it is articulated in the language of care, of justice or of difference, shares 
a commitment to grounding ethics in dialogue and practice, and orienting ethical 
prescription in ways that are sensitive to context.  
 
Feminist Activism in International Politics 
 
The growth of feminist and women's political movements in both state and inter-
state politics over the past four decades is a worldwide phenomenon. This is not a 
straightforward matter to describe, as feminist/women's movements have different 
contexts and histories and differ in their understandings of the key values and goals of 
feminism - to the extent that for some campaigners on behalf of women the very label 
'feminism' is suspect (Basu 1995, 1-21; Mohanty 2003; Agethangelou and Turcotte 
2010). For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will use the term 'feminism' in the 
broadest way possible, to refer to political movements or scholarly work which is in 
some sense premised on the need to address the ways in which women and men are, 
throughout the world, systematically disadvantaged by being assigned to the category 
'women' or ‘feminine’. This is not to suggest that some women are not systematically 
advantaged in relation to some men or that most men, as well as most women, are not 
systematically disadvantaged in the current world order. Nor is it to suggest that only 
women ever occupy the devalued ‘feminine’ position in a binary gender order. The 
feminist claim is simply that the evidence bears out the continuing relevance of gender as 
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one principle of stratification (amongst others) that systematically disadvantages most 
women and some men throughout the world (Peterson and Runyan 1993; Tickner 2001; 
Steans 2006; Shepherd 2010).  
Feminist movements and campaigns have focused on many different goals. 
Feminist politics has been an integral part of struggles for national liberation from 
imperial and colonial domination. Feminist campaigning has focused on ensuring equal 
civil and political rights for women, and transforming political institutions to be more 
representative and inclusive of women's interests. Women's material disadvantage has 
also been a crucial issue for feminists in both developed and developing economies. And 
feminists have also focused attention on violence against women; on women's rights 
over their own bodies or on social institutions and practices that discriminate against 
women. It is difficult to measure how successful feminist politics has been in relation to 
different issues and in different parts of the world or at the international level over time 
(Basu 1995; Steans 2006; Rai and Waylen 2008). However in general, women's issues 
and interests have gained a greater visibility across the board, including in state and 
international institutions, as well as domestic and international non-state movements and 
organizations. This can be illustrated by looking briefly at feminist interventions on 
issues of war and peace over the past thirty years. 
 The early 1980s was marked by the emergence of a distinctively feminist anti-
nuclear peace politics in several Western European countries as well as the USA and 
Australia. Although clearly sharing much ground with other anti-war and pacifist 
movements, this feminist peace politics was premised on the idea of a special link 
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between women and peace (Harris and King 1989; Warren and Cady 1994). Essentially, 
these feminist peace activists reversed the dominant hierarchy of evaluation of masculine 
civic virtue and feminine private virtue in which the former takes priority over the latter 
and the latter is essentially supposed to sustain the former. As Elshtain argues, in 
dominant thinking about war in the western tradition, women have been placed in the 
position of the naturally peaceful sex whose role is to provide comfort and care for the 
'just war hero' and who are invoked (along with the children) as the party on behalf of 
whom resort to political violence has been necessary (Elshtain 1987). In opposition to 
this, in the feminist peace activism of the 1980s, feminine private virtue was taken into 
the public realm and held up as the (subversive) yardstick of ethical conduct within that 
realm. The ways in which the 1980s feminist peace movement campaigned against 
militarism, nuclear weapons and Cold War politics embodied a challenge to standard 
ethical frameworks in the international context. A key part of the tactics of these 
campaigners was, quite literally, to make themselves visible to a world that recognised 
states as friends or enemies and humans as elements to be aggregated in statistics of 
putative death tolls, but not women as women. These tactics ranged from mothers 
taking babies and children with them on demonstrations (thereby quite literally putting 
the realm of private virtue in the public domain) to counter-posing traditional symbols of 
women's work and femininity to the machinery of militarism held within the bases where 
nuclear weapons were kept. In engaging in these kinds of activities women were 
affirmed as part of, and actors within, the international realm.  
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 Peace activism represents one significant strand of feminist politics that feeds 
into feminism as an international and transnational movement. The ‘Women in Black’ 
network, and a variety of other anti-militarist women’s peace organizations share a lot of 
ground with the kinds of feminist peace politics developed in the 1980s, and have 
forerunners going back to the foundation of the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom, founded during the First World War (Cockburn 2007; Moghadam 
2010: 297). Nevertheless, it is important to note that for many feminists there were deep 
problems with the link between feminism and pacifism. This was true both for feminists 
from whom women’s liberation and anti-colonial struggle were inseparable, and for 
equality feminists who argued that feminist peace politics played into and reproduced 
stereotypes about women. After the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear 
annihilation receded and a range of alternative experiences of women as protagonists 
and victims in modern warfare became the focus of feminist activism. Conflicts, for 
example in Bosnia, Liberia, Sierre Leone, Rwanda and the DRC, drew attention to the 
ways in which at the same time as women were gaining entry into military and 
paramilitary forces, and engaging in combat in increasing numbers, women were also 
experiencing the effects of both war and post-war contexts in gender specific ways. 
Feminist activists, used forums such as the UN sponsored 1995 Fourth World Women’s 
Conference in Bejing to draw attention to the gendered effects of dispossession resulting 
from war, to the prevalence of sexual violence in war, and to the exclusion or 
marginalisation of women from peace processes and various aspects of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding, including transitional justice (Enloe 1983; Vickers 1993; 
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Stiglmayer 1995; Steans 1998, 81-103; Moser and Clark 2001). In the push to bring 
women’s concerns in relation to peace and war more centrally onto the international 
agenda, the radical feminist ethos of 1980s peace activism became allied with different 
strands of feminist politics, most notably, ones that emphasised the idea of women’s 
rights as human rights, and looked to international policy and law to provide remedies 
for gender specific wrongs (Mackinnon 1993; 2006: 141-149).      
Feminist struggles for equality of right beyond the boundaries of specific states 
seek to utilise the existing principles and protocols enshrined in international law. This 
has proved difficult partly because the recognition of rights in international law is 
notoriously poorly translated into the actual practices of many states, whilst at the same 
time states themselves are the only effective enforcers of international law. However, it 
is partly also because such rights are understood as human rights and feminists have 
questioned the capacity of international human rights declarations and protocols to 
recognise and address ways in which women are excluded from power and vulnerable to 
harms because they are women (Ashworth 1999; MacKinnon 2006). Ashworth notes 
how the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the covenants on civil and 
political, social and economic rights respectively have been ineffective even in 
recognising the violation (or vulnerability to violation) of women's rights (Ashworth 
1999). In the case of civil and political rights, women's rights to bodily integrity are 
routinely violated in the context of widespread practices, for example, of domestic 
violence. In the case of socio-economic rights, women's rights are particularly badly 
affected by women's systematically disadvantaged position in relation to property 
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ownership, waged and unwaged labour (Peterson 1990; Ashworth 1999; Waring 1999; 
Peterson 2003). Yet until feminist groups began to campaign for more explicit 
recognition of the differential position of women as rights bearers, there was no 
accepted understanding that international human rights might need to be specified as 
women's rights or vice versa.  
Since the onset of the UN Decade for Women in 1975, international 
organizations have been subject to internal and external pressure from feminist 
campaigners to make sure that women are explicitly included in the category 'human'. 
This was manifested in developments such as the 1979 UN Convention for the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and in development initiatives 
concerning women and development and gender and development in the 1970s and 
1980s, as well as high profile transnational campaigns around issues such as violence 
against women and female circumcision. The focus on women’s human rights was 
intensified in the wake of the systematic rape of women that featured in the conflicts in 
Bosnia in the mid 1990s, which encouraged feminist groups to campaign for the 
international recognition of rape as a war crime, and reaffirmed feminist commitment to 
the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC), and to the need for the UN to 
explicitly address the specificity of women’s experience of war (Stiglmayer 1995; 
Mackinnon 2006). UNSCR 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and Security’, unanimously passed 
in the year 2000, reflected, and responded to, the concerns of 1990s feminist 
international activists about the gendered presuppositions and effects of war. This was 
the first time that women had been the focus of a UN resolution in relation to peace and 
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security. The resolution was hailed as a significant victory for feminist activism, and was 
preceded and succeeded by the close involvement of feminist groups in lobbying for, 
drafting, reporting on and monitoring the Resolution and its progress. Full accounts of 
the history and content of 1325 and its successors can be found elsewhere (Cohn 2008; 
Shepherd 2011). For our purposes, what is interesting is the ways in which 1325 
combines aspects of ideas associated with feminist peace activism, in which women are 
seen as having a distinctive capacity for peace, with more rights-based approaches that 
stress the goals of civil and political equality. A combination of these discourses has 
remained the predominant way in which feminist ideas have been expressed and 
implemented at the international level, and can be traced in the successor resolutions to 
1325 (Shepherd 2011), as well as in the gender-related aspects of the setting up of the 
ICC (Pankhurst 2007). 
UNSCR 1325 can be seen as the culmination of feminist activism in relation to 
war and peace over previous decades. However, its status as a victory for feminism has 
been put into question in the decade since its implementation. From the beginning certain 
feminists had reservations about 1325, including claims that it essentialised women as 
either victims or peacemakers, confirmed rather than challenged the inevitability of 
armed conflict, marginalized the realities of women combatants and men civilians, and 
was insufficiently resourced. Criticisms of 1325 were reinforced by the other 
development that has been a focus of feminist activism in relation to war and peace over 
the past decade, the so-called ‘War on Terror’. In the 1990s, sexual violence in the wars 
following the break up of Yugoslavia had become an important dimension of the 
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legitimation of external intervention in the conflict for some feminists, though not 
necessarily to feminist groups within the region. In the US response to 9/11, the 
question of the violation of women’s rights was brought centre stage in the legitimation 
of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, and more broadly in the characterisation of the 
US’s enemy other in the ‘War on Terror’ (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011).  
In ways strongly reminiscent of nineteenth century European imperial wars, the 
treatment of women became central to a standard of civilization argument that has 
continued to play a major role in legitimising ongoing operations on the part of the US 
and its allies, including invasion, occupation, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Hunt and Rygiel 2006; Towns 2010). And 
in 2001, national and transnational feminist groups and organizations had to respond to 
the claim that military action against Afghanistan could be justified on feminist grounds, 
in the context of a preceding decade of feminist campaigning against the Taliban regime 
both inside and outside Afghanistan (Thobani 2003). Although the major feminist 
activist group in Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of 
Afghanistan were against the use of military action, a minority of western feminists were 
willing to endorse the war (Elshtain 2003). This caused major political divisions within 
western feminism and added to the potential for tension between western feminists and 
feminists of the global south, tensions that were already part of the history of feminism 
as a transnational and international movement (Spivak 1999; Mohanty 2003). The 
utilisation of a discourse of women’s human rights in the justification of the ‘War on 
Terror’, and the reminder of the link between women’s rights and a traditional standards 
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of civilization discourse, caused some feminist activists to question whether UNSCR 
1325 was itself part of an imperialist project, in which the focus on women’s suffering 
became the pretext for the demonization of non-western men, and the legitimation of 
external intervention in postcolonial states (Thobani 2007; Towns 2010). It also focused 
attention on the tension between a feminist discourse that used the language of just war 
in the service of feminism, and a feminist discourse that claimed a special relation 
between women and peace. At the current time, therefore, although feminism is more 
active on the international stage, rhetorically and in practice, than it has ever been, it is 
also deeply internally contested. As we will see, this political contestation is reflected 
within and between feminist ethical perspectives. 
  
An International Feminist Ethics of Care  
  
The most well known strand in feminist moral theory since the early 1980s has been the 
idea of a feminist ethic of care, pioneered by the work of the social psychologist, Carol 
Gilligan (Gilligan 1982). In the course of research into the patterns of moral reasoning of 
women, Gilligan came to challenge the accepted hierarchy of moral psychological 
development established by Kohlberg, in which the most mature moral point of view is 
identified with the development of an impartial, universalist and principled perspective 
on moral issues (the ethic of justice). Kohlberg had observed in his own research that, 
according to his criteria, adult women were less likely to manifest an ethic of justice and 
more likely to remain at (again according to his criteria) an earlier stage of moral 
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development in which moral problems continued to be addressed in an ad hoc, highly 
personalised and contextualised way. In a familiar feminist move, Gilligan did not so 
much overturn Kohlberg's findings as re-evaluate them, arguing that the characteristics 
of women's moral thinking were not inferior to an ethic of justice but demonstrated an 
equally advanced and sophisticated post-conventional moral point of view. In the wake 
of the argument between Kohlberg and Gilligan a huge literature has arisen in social 
psychology and ethical and political theory which both criticises and develops Gilligan's 
original insight (Bubeck 1998; Held 2006; Robinson 1999; 2011). In terms of feminist 
ethical and political theory, the concerns of the debate shifted quickly from arguments 
about whether men and women actually think differently in relation to moral problems to 
exploring the pros and cons of the features of women's moral reasoning identified by 
Gilligan, features which have come to be defined as those of an 'ethic of care'.  
The key feature of an ethic of care is that it is embedded in the practicalities of 
relationships of responsibility for others. Crucial to ethical judgment from the 
perspective of care is the importance of particularity (knowing who and what you are 
making a moral judgment about); connectedness (recognising your actual relationship to 
others in the process of judgment); and context (paying attention to the broad and 
narrow context of ethical judgment). In her book, Maternal Thinking: Towards a 
Politics of Peace, Ruddick draws on the idea of an ethic of care as a central part of her 
argument for a feminist moral orientation in the context of international politics 
(Ruddick 1990). The book involves a rejection of realist arguments as to the tragic 
inevitability or structural necessity of war and communitarian claims as to the special 
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ethical status of the collective group or nation. In addition it develops a critique of 
traditional just war thinking - in both utilitarian and Kantian variants - as well as a 
positive characterization of how a different kind of moral judgment and political practice 
is possible in relation to war. There are essentially two stages to Ruddick's argument. In 
the first stage she offers a phenomenology of what she terms 'maternal thinking', in the 
second stage she reads off the implications of using maternal thinking as a critical 
'feminist standpoint' for making judgments about the ethics of war and the appropriate 
feminist response to war.  
  'Maternal thinking', according to Ruddick, 'is a discipline in attentive love', a 
discipline which is rooted in the demands of a particular relation of care, that between 
mother and child, and which reflects a particular range of metaphysical attitudes, 
cognitive capacities and virtues (Ruddick 1990, 123). Ruddick is careful to insist that 
she is neither equating mothers with biological mothers, nor presuming that actual 
mothers are all good at maternal thinking. Ruddick draws a contrast between the ideals 
of response to threat, conflict and harm which are inherent in any practice in which 
violence is understood as a permissible instrument for the attainment of goals and modes 
of responding to threat, conflict and harm which are premised on the unacceptability of 
violence. She finds paradigmatic examples of the former in militarism and of the latter in 
the labour of care. 
"Caregivers are not, predictably, better people than are militarists. Rather, 
they are engaged in a different project. Militarists aim to dominate by 
creating the the structural vulnerabilities that caregivers take for granted. 
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They arm and train so that they can, if other means of domination fail, terrify 
and injure their opponents. By contrast, in situations where domination 
through bodily pain, and the fear of pain, is a structural possibility, 
caregivers try to resist temptations to assault and neglect, even though they 
work among smaller, frailer, vulnerable people who may excite domination." 
(Ruddick 1993, 121) 
Ruddick is aware of the problems of simply taking and applying the regulative ideals of 
care-giving practices to the realm of international politics, but nevertheless, she 
extrapolates criteria of ethical judgment from caregiving practice which she argues do 
have implications for what should or should not be permissible within the international 
realm. Ruddick argues that maternal thinking, located as it is in the marginalized and 
denigrated sphere of caring labour, provides a standpoint from which the absurdity of 
both strategic military and just war thinking becomes evident. Although Ruddick does 
not claim that the feminist standpoint provides a universally valid ground for ethical 
judgment, she does make a strong claim for the potential of maternal thinking to 
illuminate the meaning of war from a critical perspective (Ruddick 1990, 135; Hartsock 
1983). For Ruddick, both militarism and just war theory share a commitment to the 
expendability of concrete lives in abstract causes to which maternal thinking is inherently 
opposed. Ruddick claims that this means that the implication of maternal thinking is not 
just the rejection of war but the active embracing of peace politics, a fight against war 
which draws on the acknowledgement of responsibility and relationship and the 
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specificity of need and obligations which are inherent in a proper understanding of the 
labour of caring (Ruddick 1990, 141-159). 
"The analytic fictions of just war theory require a closure of moral issues 
final enough to justify killing and "enemies" abstract enough to be killable. In 
learning to welcome their own and their children's changes, mothers become 
accustomed to open-ended, concrete reflection on intricate and 
unpredictable spirits. Maternal attentive love, restrained and clear sighted, is 
ill adapted to intrusive, let alone murderous judgments of others' lives." 
(Ruddick 1990, 150)  
 In Ruddick's theory the logic of domestic relations in the restricted sense of the domestic 
or private sphere is set against the logic of the public sphere of both state and inter-state 
relations, although with the acknowledgement that in practice the former has tended to 
support and reinforce the latter. Ruddick places realism, morality of states, Kantianism, 
utilitarianism and communitarianism all firmly in the realm of the logic of public 
'masculinist' theory and practice. Although it is clear that Ruddick does put an ethical 
value on humans, this is based not on a notion of inherent individual right, but on 
relation - value inheres in relations to others, in particular in the recognition of 
responsibility for others. For Ruddick then, the realm of international politics is primarily 
a realm of human relations, not of human, nation or state rights or an international state 
system. Ruddick assumes that ethical perspectives are the outcome of concrete practices 
and can never be neutral, but at the same time clearly suggests that some kinds of 
practice are inherently better than others. This distinction draws attention to the fact that 
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although Ruddick presents an understanding of the international realm very different 
from mainstream ethical theories, nevertheless, she argues for the notion of a standpoint 
from which critical judgments of international politics can be made. This standpoint is 
inherently prescriptive and involves a commitment to the practical and political struggle 
against violence and for peace. 
 There are several different implications of Ruddick's argument in relation to 
ethical judgment. Firstly, from the standpoint of maternal thinking, the appropriate 
stance to take in ethical judgment is to attempt to build on particular experiences of the 
practice of care to help to identify with and take responsibility for the needs and 
suffering of others. Ruddick frequently cites the example of the Argentinian mothers of 
the disappeared, whose movement gradually grew to embrace concerns with children 
across the world who had suffered harm: "This is not transcendent impartiality but a 
sympathetic apprehension of another grounded in one's own particular suffering." 
(Ruddick 1993, 123) This is not just a matter of 'feeling for' another's pain, but assuming 
an attitude of responsibility for it and therefore trying to do something about it. 
Secondly, however, maternal thinking is sensitive to the specific contexts in which 
ethical dilemmas are embedded and the importance of appreciating the ethical weight of 
the perspectives of all parties to any dispute or conflict. For Ruddick, ethical judgment 
has to be on a case by case basis, but without ready made principles of adjudication. 
Although the idea of maternal thinking is in principle non-violent, it also makes clear that 
there are no universally applicable algorithms that can be applied to any given situation 
to render definitive answers to ethical questions, so that even the use of violence cannot 
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be entirely ruled out a priori (Ruddick 1990: 138; Ruddick 1998). The judgment of the 
maternal thinker is oriented by the ideals implicit in care, but these are regulative rather 
than determining in their effects. This brings us to the third feature of ethical judgment 
from the standpoint of maternal thinking. In contrast to the traditional picture of ethical 
judgment as a matter to be worked through at the level of the individual conscience in 
relation to specified criteria, maternal thinking implies that ethical judgment is a matter 
of dialogue and context and relies crucially on the capacity to hear what others are 
saying in arriving at the criteria for judgment. Ethical judgment is therefore in principle 
an interactive and collective rather than an individual project.  
   
Feminist Alternatives to Care Ethics in the International Context 
 
 Ruddick’s version of care ethics is closely linked to the history of feminist anti-
militarism and peace campaigning. The kind of feminist politics reflected and celebrated 
in her work is context specific, anti-state, and grass roots. For Ruddick, maternal 
thinking constitutes an ethic of resistance that is fully compatible with the feminist aim of 
addressing and redressing the ways in which women are systematically disadvantaged 
within the current world order. For other feminist ethicists and activists, however, an 
ethic of care, because it gives priority to particular relations of care rather than to 
universal standards of rights and justice, does not do enough to protect and support 
women in the world as it is. Justice feminists are suspicious of the apparent confirmation 
and affirmation of the traditional role of women in the idea of maternal thinking. 
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Revaluing caring work within the family and the private sphere in their view threatens to 
perpetuate women's peculiar vulnerabilities within the current world order (Okin 1999; 
Nussbaum 2000). This has led to the development of strands of feminist ethics that build 
on and adapt existing cosmopolitan traditions of thinking about rights and justice. 
 As noted in Section One, feminists have objected to international human rights 
thinking on the grounds that 'human' is too general a category and that both the theory 
and practice of human rights has failed to provide the same ethical resources for women 
as it has done for men. However, from a justice perspective this does not entail the 
rejection of rights thinking altogether. For example, Mackinnon claims that 
contemporary human rights thinking has been characterised by the exclusion of women 
from the category of humanity:  
"If you are hurt as a member of a group, the odds that the groups will be 
considered human are improved if it concludes men. Under guarantees of 
international human rights, as well as in everyday life, a woman is "not yet a 
name for a way of being human"." (Mackinnon 1993, 91)  
The root cause of this exclusion is, in Mackinnon's view, the lack of recognition in the 
discourse of human or individual rights of the fundamentally patriarchal structure of 
both states and inter-state relations in the modern world. Where Ruddick looks to 
women's experience under patriarchy as care givers as the source of a new ethics, 
Mackinnon's focus is on the systematic and institutionalised power differential between 
men and women in modernity and the ways in which this results in women persistently 
failing to qualify as fully fledged human beings in terms of their effective protection 
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under state and international law. This argument, that women have been incorporated 
into the ranks of rights bearers on different terms from men is a familiar one in feminist 
political theory (see Pateman 1988). Mackinnon makes the argument in relation to 
women as bearers of international rights by focusing on the lack of fit between the 
ideology of human rights and the actuality of women's position. 
 Although Mackinnon criticises existing human rights discourses, she is careful to 
stress that the idea of rights is of tremendous ethical importance and that the growth of 
human rights discourses has provided vital resources for political resistance and legal 
protection of individuals within states and internationally. From a feminist point of view, 
it is clearly better to have rape recognised explicitly as a crime against humanity than for 
it to continue to be regarded as just another unfortunate side effect of war. However, at 
the same time, Mackinnon sees the resources offered by generic understandings of 
human rights as being seriously inadequate because they mask the differential realities of 
women's position and therefore effectively disempower their supposed beneficiaries. 
This argument is parallel to arguments developed in the context of feminist struggles 
over rights within the state, that in order for equality of right for women to be a reality, 
women need rights which are specific to them and which, when institutionalised, will 
help to deconstruct the gendered relations of power in which women are currently 
caught. Mackinnon’s ideal retains the idea of a 'single standard of human dignity and 
entitlement' that has always been central to rights-based thinking, but the meaning of this 
single standard is interpreted in terms which do not rely on the notion of a universal 
sameness to underpin the single standard. Mackinnon takes the ground of rights as being 
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the actual power differentials between different groups (specifically in this case, man and 
women) and the struggles of the disempowered to improve their subordinate position. 
Rights are therefore a political weapon as much as a moral ideal, which can be used 
themselves to alter the realities we inhabit. In this respect, therefore, Mackinnon’s 
position is closely aligned with the struggles of feminists to extend recognition of 
women’s human rights within international affairs referred to in Section One above. 
 Another influential example of a feminist justice ethics is the argument put forward by 
Martha Nussbaum in her book Women and Human Development (2000). In this book, Nussbaum 
finds the grounds for certain (limited) universal ethical values and claims in a set of human 
‘capabilities’ that she argues are foundational for the flourishing of any human life. She then uses 
the example of the lives of women in developing countries as a way to exemplify how the 
capabilities approach can be used as a kind of yardstick to critique existing practice in different 
national contexts and to provide fundamental principles for progress, in particular progress for 
women. At the heart of Nussbaum’s feminist justice ethics is a commitment to the intrinsic value 
of humanity and the right of every individual to be enabled to live ‘humanly’, that is in such a way 
that they are not simply subordinated to the ends of others but are enabled to exercise choices in 
the way that they live their lives. At present, according to Nussbaum, women in developing 
countries are particularly likely to experience their lives as subordinated to others, including the 
demands of patriarchal cultures and of exploitative conditions of work. For this reason, she 
argues against approaches to morality that base themselves in cultural difference (Okin 1999). In 
spite of her critique of communitarianism, however, Nussbaum’s particular version of moral 
universalism is, she argues, less prone to problems associated with other kinds of justice ethics 
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because it does not so much elaborate a substantive set of moral principles that all must follow, 
but rather specifies ‘human capabilities’ that are inherently enabling rather than prescriptive, and 
that can be the ongoing subject of debate. This still allows room for culture to play an important 
ethical role (Nussbaum 2000: 7, 70-71). The capabilities that Nussbaum outlines as of universal 
ethical significance are listed below:  
1. Life – ability to live out a natural life span 
2. Bodily Health – ability to have good health including reproductive health, adequate 
nourishment, shelter 
3. Bodily integrity – freedom of movement, security from physical violation, sexual 
and reproductive autonomy 
4. Senses, imagination, thought – ability to use all of these fully in an educated way 
5. Emotions – ability to be attached to others, to have a capacity for love and affection 
6. Practical Reason – to be able to reflect rationally, identify one’s own conception of 
the good life and plan for it 
7. Affiliation – ability to live with others in personal relationships and social 
communities 
8. Other species – ability to live in relation to nature 
9. Play – ability to enjoy recreation 
10. Control over one’s material and political environment – ability to participate in political 
choices, ability to hold property, to work on equal terms with others. (Nussbaum 2000: 78-81). 
Nussbaum uses the above list as a reference point for making judgments about the 
actual lives and conditions of women in developing countries, using India as her specific 
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example. It becomes clear very quickly that the capabilities approach is ethically very 
demanding, in that it requires the institutionalisation of equality across a range of domains 
even to live up to threshold conditions. For example, the capability to live in affiliation with 
others is, in Nussbaum’s view, fatally undermined by status-based discrimination on grounds 
of ‘race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin’ (Nussbaum 79). 
Even though Mackinnon’s and Nussbaum’s arguments are very different they both typify an 
ethics of justice in the sense that they impose limits in principle on what can count as a 
morally valid account of justice or rights for women in the international domain. And also in 
the sense that radical changes at the level of international law and institutions are needed in 
order to fulfil requirements of justice for women. 
 Feminist ethics of care and of justice relate to the dominant vocabularies of 
feminist activism in the international domain over the past forty years. In many ways 
the text of UNSCR 1325 combines these vocabularies, stressing women’s distinctive 
ethical qualities as peacemakers on the one hand, and arguing for institutionalising 
gender mainstreaming and women’s human rights on the other. There is, however, 
another strand of feminist ethical thinking, which challenges both care and justice 
arguments from the point of view of feminist difference. Feminist difference ethics is 
inspired by objections to the universalisation of particular western historical 
experiences that underpin the ethics of care and of justice, and objections to the kinds 
of politics associated with those ethics. It is theoretically influenced by 
poststructuralist feminism on the one hand, and postcolonial feminism on the other 
(Mohanty et al 1991; Spivak 1999). Difference feminists argue that care ethics 
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essentialises a specific idea of women and femininity that is grounded in the history 
and culture of western societies, and its model of familial and community relations. At 
the same time, they argue that justice feminists conflate the universal with western, 
liberal ideals of human rights for women. In both cases, it is argued, this means that 
these versions of feminist ethics are insufficiently sensitive to the ethical significance of 
major differences and inequalities between women. Difference feminists insist on the 
ethical significance of the fact that all women are not the same, either in virtue of being 
women or in virtue of being human (Jabri 1999; Peterson 1990; Butler 2004).  
This is not simply a theoretical dispute. For difference feminists the prescriptive 
implications of care in relation to peace and of justice in relation to human rights and 
development have been shown to be ethically problematic for women who don’t fit 
with standard western liberal assumptions about either women or humans. Many 
feminists from the developing world have supported wars in the pursuit of struggles 
for decolonisation and national liberation and deny that there is a necessary connection 
between feminist ethics and peace politics. Similarly, many feminists in the global 
south are wary of the liberal language of global human rights and economic 
development and argue that it reflects the moral priorities of an earlier western history 
and has been used to justify first imperialism and subsequently other forms of 
interventionism in the Global South. For difference feminists, ‘context’ is not 
equivalent to a monolithic account of ‘culture’. From the difference point of view, 
culture and identity, like all other facets of social and political life, are sites of power 
relations and struggles, there is therefore always a political dimension to ethics, and 
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this, according to difference feminists, is the dimension that care and justice feminists, 
in different ways, neglect. 
For difference ethics it is ethical principles of respect for plurality and 
democracy that are fundamental to feminism. Although they share with care and 
justice feminisms a commitment to challenging gendered relations of power, for 
difference feminists specific questions about what moral values should guide human 
conduct at a global level are incapable of being satisfactorily answered unless and until 
the world has changed in such a way that the voices of those currently most excluded 
from moral debate can be heard (Spivak 1999; Mohanty 2003; Hutchings 2004). In the 
meantime, moral priority must be given to those ethical values that do most to support 
struggles to change the world to include the excluded, and that do least to further 
repress the voices of the least powerful actors in current world politics. The problem 
with this ethical project is that, as difference feminists themselves point out, any 
explicitly articulated universal ethical claim in international ethics always carries its 
own exclusions with it, intended or unintended. This is typified by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which, for example, in speaking of all human beings’ 
fundamental right to marriage and family life, necessarily excludes those human beings 
who do not fit with heterosexual norms, or with the assumption of a humanity split 
into two genders (Butler 2004: 102-130).  
One of the feminist ethical theorists who has addressed what difference ethics 
implies in an international context is Judith Butler. Focusing on the concept of 
universal human rights, Butler has shown how the concept of the human in human 
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rights, by setting up a norm of what it means to be human, consistently operates so as 
to situate certain categories of people as ‘less than’ human, rendering their lives in 
crucial respects ‘unliveable’ and ‘ungrievable’ (Butler 2004: 225-227). Thus she 
directly challenges Nussbaum’s claim that it is through an inclusive account of what it 
means to be human that a genuinely universal international ethics can be articulated as 
a yardstick for the judgement of practice. At the same time, Butler does not advocate 
the abandonment of the idea of universal rights, but rather argues that the meaning of 
‘universal’ should always be open to challenge and re-negotiation, and that we should 
never assume that our claims to universality actually live up to their promise (Butler 
2004: 33). Somewhat paradoxically, difference ethics is universalist in its orientation 
towards giving moral priority to the excluded in general, but sees this universalism as 
always failing.  
For difference ethics, ethical priorities will differ depending on context, so that 
there is (and ought to be) no feminist consensus on either the ethics of war or the 
nature of fundamental human being. It is therefore inappropriate to condemn practices 
such as female circumcision in the abstract, without a full understanding of the context 
of the practice and the ethical investments of the different parties to it. Moreover, the 
exponent of an ethics of difference needs to take responsibility for his or her own 
judgment and actions and recognise that well-intended arguments and policies may 
have unforeseen effects when implemented in a top down way. In this respect, 
difference ethics is linked to feminist criticisms of the ‘War on Terror’ and 
humanitarian interventions from the 1990s onwards, which perpetuated a politics of 
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rescue in which white western men ‘save’, in Spivak’s words, brown women from 
brown men (Hutchings 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that feminist approaches to the ethics of international 
affairs differ. To the extent that it’s not clear whether the term ‘feminist’ actually signifies 
something substantive that ties different feminist approaches together. Does it make sense to 
use the same term to encompass the quite different arguments of care, justice and difference 
feminist ethics? In conclusion, I want to suggest that in spite of the degree of contestation 
between these different ethical perspectives, there are certain commonalities. Feminism was 
inspired by the vulnerabilities suffered by women on account of an entrenched gender order 
that excluded them from moral status and political power. What links the different forms of 
feminist ethics together is the aspiration (which is not always achieved) of de-centring moral 
judgment from the standpoint of the privileged. This essentially political project must 
therefore cultivate a strong degree of self-consciousness about tendencies within ethical 
reasoning that reinstate or reinforce patterns of privilege and disadvantage. This is the reason, 
I would argue, why the kinds of contextualism and universalism at work in the different 
versions of feminist ethics are much less fixed and mutually exclusive than we find when 
comparing mainstream deontological, consequentialist or communitarian ethical arguments. 
Ruddick’s ethic of care, although it gives universal moral status to the virtues inherent in 
maternal thinking, because of its contextualism, refuses to pre-judge the implications of 
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maternal thinking for ethical prescription. Mackinnon’s commitment to women’s human rights 
does not offer us a closed definition of what it means to be human, instead it presents a 
dynamic vision of human rights politics grounded in the existence of inequalities of power. 
Nussbaum’s universalism is tempered by a strong requirement for contextual sensitivity, and 
she attempts, whether successfully or not, to locate her international ethics in the lives of non-
western women. And Butler’s critique of universalism does not lead her to reject the ethical 
significance of the idea of the universal or the value of the discourse of universal human 
rights.  
Characteristics of theoretical humility and eclecticism distinguish recent developments 
in feminist international ethics that build on ethical insights from care, justice and difference. 
For example, Fiona Robinson’s work has extended the purview of the ethic of care to 
questions of global distributive justice, caring labour in the international political economy as 
well as questions of humanitarian intervention and international security. In doing so, 
however, she has combined care thinking with postcolonial, difference arguments (Robinson 
1999; 2011). In a very different vein, Laura Sjoberg has combined aspects of the ethic of care 
with just war theory in her development of a feminist security ethic of empathetic cooperation 
(Sjoberg 2006). And Brooke Ackerly has developed an activist-informed immanent theory of 
the human rights of women that combines aspects of the kind of thinking that informs 
Mackinnnon’s understanding of rights as political weapons, and Butler’s critique of rights 
universalism (Ackerly 2008). In my view, the apparent tensions within, as well as between, 
feminist ethical perspectives on international affairs reflect the difficulty of trying to hold on to 
an ethical standpoint that starts from the position of the vulnerable and excluded, and which is 
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therefore perpetually dissatisfied with any settled standpoint of judgment or final answer to 
the question of meaning of international justice. In spite of genuine differences between them, 
feminist ethical projects share certain qualities. They give priority to dialogue as the starting 
point for ethical judgment, and the prescriptive conclusions they draw are contextually 
specific and open to revision in the light of experience.  
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